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Introduction to the U.S. feminist judgments project
Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger, and Bridget J. Crawford

How would U.S. Supreme Court opinions change if the justices used feminist
methods and perspectives when deciding cases? That is the central question
that we sought to answer by bringing together a group of scholars and lawyers
to carry out this project. To answer it, they would use feminist theories to
rewrite the most significant gender justice cases decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court from the passage of the final Civil Rights Amendment in 1870 to the
summer of 2015.
As an initial matter, we provided no guidance to our contributors on what
we meant by “feminism.” We wanted our authors to be free to bring their own
vision of feminism to the project. Yet it would be disingenuous to suggest that
we ourselves do not have a particular perspective on what “feminism,” “feminist reasoning,” or “feminist methods” are. Indeed, without such a perspective,
we would not have undertaken the project.
We recognize “feminism” as a movement and perspective historically
grounded in politics, and one that motivates social, legal, and other battles for
women’s equality. We also understand it as a movement and mode of inquiry
that has grown to endorse justice for all people, particularly those historically
oppressed or marginalized by or through law.1 We believe that “feminism”
is not the province of women only, and we acknowledge and celebrate the
multiple, fluid identities contained in the category “woman.”2 Within this
broad view, we acknowledge that feminists can disagree (and still be feminist)
and that there are no unitary feminist methods or reasoning processes. So
when we refer to feminist methods or feminist reasoning processes, we mean
1

2

So-called “third-wave” feminists particularly see feminism as a broader social justice issue.
See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women,
Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 Mich. J. Gender & L. 99, 102 (2007); Kristen Kalsem
and Verna L. Williams, Social Justice Feminism, 18 UCLA Women’s L.J. 131, 169–72 (2010).
See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 830 (1990).
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“methods” and “reasoning processes” plural, all the while acknowledging that
there is a rich and diverse body of scholarship that has flourished under the
over-arching label “feminist legal theory.” Indeed, those are the methods and
reasoning processes examined and employed by many of the authors represented in the book.
Nevertheless, in shaping the project from its early stages through the finished pages, we as editors have been motivated by a broad and expansive view
of what “feminism” is. This capacious understanding undoubtedly shaped the
project in many ways, including our choice of cases, our selection of authors,
and our edits, even if we did not define feminism for our contributors. We
leave it to readers to explore the varieties of feminism that are reflected in
these pages.
Feminist legal theory and scholarship have developed and even thrived
within universities over the last thirty to forty years. Feminist activists and
lawyers are responsible for major changes in the law of employment discrimination, sexual harassment, marital rape, reproductive rights, family relationships, and equitable distribution, to name just a few areas. Feminism has had
a less discernable impact on judging, however, and it is relatively rare to see
explicitly feminist reasoning in judicial decisions. More common are judicial
reliance on the doctrine of stare decisis and judicial use of the language of
apparent neutrality. Both of these moves tend to obscure embedded and structural biases in the law, making it difficult to recognize that feminism offers a
critical expansion of the field for judicial decision making.
The twenty-five opinions in this volume demonstrate that judges who are
open to feminist viewpoints could have arrived at different decisions or applied
different reasoning to reach the same (or different) results in major decisions
of the U.S. Supreme Court. As the authors reworked their opinions related to
gender, they applied feminist theory or methods. The resulting feminist judgments demonstrate that neither the initial outcome nor the subsequent development of the law was necessary or inevitable. Feminist reasoning expands
the judicial capacity for equal justice and can help make more attainable
political, economic, and social equality for women and other disadvantaged
groups.

Goals of the project
Although the project has a number of goals, one priority is to uncover that what
passes for neutral law making and objective legal reasoning is often bound up
in traditional assumptions and power hierarchies. That is, all legal actors –
judges, juries, litigants, lawyers – engage in their decision making within
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a situated perspective that is informed by gender, race, class, religion, disability, nationality, language, and sexual orientation. For judges, that (often
unacknowledged) situated perspective can be crucial to the reasoning and
the outcome of cases. The situated perspective of the decision maker may
drive American jurisprudence as much as – if not more than – stare decisis does. A judge’s worldview may inform the choices that the judge makes
about the doctrinal basis for an opinion. For example, a judge may need to
choose whether a lawsuit should be decided as a substantive due process case
about privacy rights or as an equal protection case about gender equality.
Recognizing that all decision making involves a situated perspective reveals
that decision makers are affected by assumptions and expectations of norms
relating to gender, race, class, sexuality, and other characteristics. Despite the
alleged neutrality of the rules and processes of decision making within the
U.S. judicial system, values and beliefs shaped by experience may exert a significant, if difficult-to-see, influence on the judges’ interpretation and application of the law.
The U.S. Feminist Judgments Project turns attention to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Contributors to this volume challenge the formalistic concepts that
U.S. Supreme Court opinions are, or should be, written from a neutral
vantage point and that they are, or should be, based on deductive logic or
“pure” rationality. When the project’s authors brought their own feminist
consciousness or philosophy to some of the most important (and supposedly
“neutral”) decisions and assertions about gender-related issues, the judicial
decisions took on a very different character. Feminist consciousness broadens and widens the lens through which we view law and helps the decision
maker overcome the natural tendency to see things the same way or do things
“the way they’ve always been done.” Through this project, we hope to show
that systemic inequalities are not intrinsic to law, but rather may be rooted in
the subjective (and often unconscious) beliefs and assumptions of the decision makers. These inequalities may derive from processes and influences
that tend to reinforce traditional or familiar approaches, decisions, or values.
In other words, if we can broaden the perspectives of the decision makers,
change in the law is possible.
In addition to exposing the contextual nature of judicial decision making,
another goal of the project was to learn what “feminist” judging and decision making would look like, both from a substantive and rhetorical standpoint. What would the world look like if women and men with self-identified
feminist consciousness were judges? With regard to substance, we wondered
which of the many feminist theories would have practical application in judging and decision making and which laws contained the greatest potential for
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feminist application. Would we see some feminist theories or methods more
frequently used than others? Which ones?
In terms of language, we wondered whether some feminist judges might
use language or rhetorical strategies that differed from the original opinions
in describing the facts or issue of a case, or the applicable law or reasoning.3
To some scholars, the very label “feminist judgments” will suggest a particular
feminist language, but the idea that feminists might speak in a “different” language or voice is a controversial one.4 As our sister-editors in the U.K. observed,
law is “a powerful and productive social discourse that creates and reinforces
gender norms … [L]aw does not simply operate on pre-existing gendered realities, but contributes to the construction of those realities.”5 We wanted our
book to open a small vista on what law might look like if feminists were able
to contribute, in a meaningful way, to that powerful, constitutive discourse.

Intellectual origins of the project
The U.S. Feminist Judgments Project is inspired by a similar project in
the United Kingdom. In 2013, Kathy Stanchi attended the Applied Legal
Storytelling Conference in London where she heard Professor Erika Rackley
speak about the U.K. Feminist Judgments project, a volume of rewritten decisions from the House of Lords and Court of Appeal. The U.K. Project, itself
inspired by the Women’s Court of Canada,6 united fifty-one feminist professors, practitioners, and research fellows to supply the “missing” feminist voice
in British jurisprudence by rewriting, using feminist reasoning, key cases on
parenting, property and markets, criminal law, public law, and equality. The

3

4

5

6

Some legal scholars have criticized certain traditional aspects of the judicial voice as intertwined with the class, race, and gender bias in the law. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking
Women’s Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 886, 888 (1989); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Feminist Legal Writing, 39 S.D. L. Rev.
387, 402–03 (2002).
Compare Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women’s
Lawyering Process, 1 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 39 (1985); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and
the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va. L. Rev. 543, 592–613 (1986) with
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 45 (1987)
(“take your foot off our necks, then we will hear in what tongue women speak”).
Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice 6–7 (Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and
Erika Rackley eds., 2010) (referencing Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (1989)).
The Women’s Court of Canada brought together a group of academics and practitioners who rewrote several cases involving section 15 (the equality clause) of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Their opinions are now online. Decisions of the Women’s
Court of Canada, TheCourt.ca (Sept. 9, 2015, 12:52 PM), www.thecourt.ca/decisions-of-thewomens-court-of-canada/.
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U.K. Project has spawned similar projects covering Irish, Australian, and New
Zealand law, as well as a project devoted to the field of international law.7
Having long wondered why feminist legal theory, despite its rich and vibrant
academic history in the U.S., had not made greater inroads into American
jurisprudence, we realized that the body of U.S. common law was overdue
for feminist rewriting. Kathy Stanchi, Linda Berger, and Bridget Crawford
agreed to serve as the project’s editors, and a group of informal advisors organized by Kathy Stanchi met at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools to discuss how many and which cases to choose for
rewriting. Searching for a unifying theme that would tie the cases together,
Bridget Crawford suggested limiting the selection to U.S. Supreme Court
cases because of the Court’s influence on the legal knowledge and awareness of the American public. Although restricting the project to U.S. Supreme
Court cases limited the doctrinal coverage and excluded important state and
lower court cases, the benefit of a unifying focus outweighed the detriments.
The editors realized early on that this could be the first of many U.S. feminist judgment projects. Like the U.K. project, the U.S. project might inspire
feminist treatment of the decisions of other courts or other subject matters.
For example, future projects might focus on decisions of state courts, appellate courts, and administrative agencies. Alternatively, future projects might
be organized by following traditional subject-matter lines (e.g., torts, criminal
law, property, civil procedure), or by developing areas of interest (e.g., entertainment law, farming law), or by applying additional critical theories (e.g.,
critical race theory, Lat Crit, critical tax theory). We welcome and invite such
future work.

Methodology
Even after deciding to limit the project to decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, we still had to narrow the scope. Beginning with the active duty of
Chief Justice John Jay in 1789, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided more
than 1,700 cases. In keeping with the impetus for the project, we decided to
limit our pool of potential cases to those related to gender, although we all
agreed that many other cases could benefit from a feminist rewriting. Our initial list contained nearly sixty cases.

7

See Feminist Judgments Project, www.kent.ac.uk/law/fjp/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2015); Northern/
Irish Feminist Judgments Project, www.feministjudging.ie/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2015); Australian
Feminist Judgments Project, www.law.uq.edu.au/the-australian-feminist-judgments-project
(last visited Sept. 9, 2015).
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To minimize the influence of personal preferences and to benefit from
the views of a range of diverse and knowledgeable experts, we assembled an
Advisory Panel to help us select the cases most appropriate for rewriting. The
panel included twenty-three scholars with expertise in feminist theory, constitutional law, or both. Its members were diverse in race, gender, sexuality, and
academic background. We were honored to have the advisory participation of
Kathryn Abrams, Katharine Bartlett, Devon Carbado, Mary Anne Case, Erwin
Chemerinsky, April Cherry, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Martha Albertson Fineman,
Margaret Johnson, Sonia Katyal, Nancy Leong, Catharine MacKinnon,
Rachel Moran, Melissa Murray, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Nancy Polikoff,
Dorothy Roberts, Daniel Rodriguez, Susan Deller Ross, Vicki Schultz, Dean
Spade, Robin West, and Verna Williams. We asked them to evaluate all sixty
cases for possible feminist rewriting. Their feedback was surprisingly consistent, and we narrowed our initial list of sixty to thirty potential cases.
Having decided to follow the U.K. model of publishing a rewritten opinion
accompanied by an expert commentary that would frame and provide context for the revision, we next issued a public call inviting potential authors
to apply to rewrite one of the thirty cases or to comment on a rewritten opinion. Providing commentary for each rewritten opinion was important because
the original opinions would not be included in the volume. The commentary describes the original decision, places it within its historical context, and
assesses its continuing effects. Equally important, the commentary analyzes
the rewritten feminist judgment, emphasizing how it differs both in process
and effect from the original opinion. By following this format of matching
rewritten opinion and commentary throughout the writing and editing process, we were able not only to include additional voices but also to gain the
benefits of productive collaboration among opinion writers, commentators,
and editors.
In response to the call for authors, we received more than one hundred
applications, mostly from law professors, but also from practitioners, clerks,
and others. Our applicants represented a range of subject-matter specialties,
expertise, and experience. They were well-known feminist legal theorists of
established reputation and standing as well as more junior scholars, both
tenured and untenured. Some were firmly grounded in theory while others
were more familiar with the substance and methods of law practice, including
practicing attorneys, clinicians, and legal writing professors.
As editors, we were committed to diversity on many levels. In terms of cases,
our almost-final list of twenty-four cases was chosen to represent a range of
gender-related issues. In terms of authors, we sought contributors who were
diverse in perspective, expertise, and status as well as race, sexuality, and gender.
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In addition to the forty-eight authors selected to write the twenty-four opinions and their matching commentaries, we invited Professor Berta Esperanza
Hernández-Truyol to write a chapter that would provide an overview of
feminist legal theory and an account of feminist judging. The project was
well underway in June 2015 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Obergefell
v. Hodges,8 a landmark case on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage. We
immediately added that case, along with the authors of Obergefell’s rewritten opinion and commentary, to the book. The final volume thus includes
twenty-five cases and represents the contributions of fifty-one authors and the
three editors.

Guidelines for the opinions and commentary
The purpose of the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project is to show, in a practical and realistic way, that U.S. Supreme Court decisions could have been
decided differently had the justices approached their decisions from a more
complex and contextualized vantage. To illustrate this point, we asked the
opinion writers to engage in a re-envisioning of the decision-making process,
drawing on their own knowledge of feminist methods and theories, but bound
by the facts and law that existed at the time. Opinion authors were limited as
well to 8,000 words (far less than many U.S. Supreme Court opinions) but
were free to choose to write a majority opinion, a dissent, or a concurrence,
depending on their goals. A major practical difference between this project
and real judging is that our authors were not constrained by the necessity of
persuading other justices. It would have been unrealistic to require, across the
board, that the authors speculate (in some uniform way) about what might
have been accomplished through the formal (but not uniform) give-and-take
that traditionally happens between justices at conference and in the more
informal discussions among peers in the halls and chambers.
Authors were limited in the sources they could use in writing their opinions.
They could draw only on facts and law in existence at the time of the original
opinion. Many of our authors chafed at this constraint. But we felt strongly
that such a source constraint, one of the hallmarks of the U.K. project, was
essential to the legitimacy and goals of the U.S. project. To make the point that
law may be driven by perspective as much as stare decisis, it was critical that
the feminist justices be bound, just as the original justices were, to the law and
precedent in effect at the time.

8

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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In terms of materials other than the facts and law in existence at the time of
the opinion, we recognized that our opinion writers likely would be unable to
avoid using feminist arguments and critiques that emerged after the original
opinion. This was especially true with respect to cases decided before the
1970s, when the modern women’s liberation movement gained traction in the
United States. Opinion writers could draw upon theories and philosophies
that became familiar and widely used after the original decision, but they were
required to cite only to contemporaneous sources. This struck us as a fair compromise. After all, we believe that it is an inherent and unavoidable aspect of
judging that the decision makers bring to the law their own cultural and social
assumptions (often uncited). So like any judges, our authors could espouse
cultural or social views and bring their perspectives to their interpretation and
application of the law.
As it turned out, these restrictions on sources of authority were less inhibiting than expected. Many of our authors reported that, to their surprise, the
feminist analyses, social theories, and arguments that they wished to rely on
were in circulation at the time of the original decision, and sometimes even
well represented in the amicus briefs before the Court. This was true even of
our oldest decision in Bradwell v. Illinois,9 a U.S. Supreme Court case denying
a woman admission to the bar. Professor Phyllis Goldfarb, the author of the
revised opinion in Bradwell, reports that advocates of women’s rights in the
late 1800s had introduced into the mainstream public discourse feminist egalitarian ideals about women’s participation in professional and public life, and
they made strong arguments within the existing legal framework to advance
these ideals. Reports like this from our authors confirm that our initial hypothesis had been correct: it is not that feminist arguments did not exist at the time
of particular decisions, but rather that feminist consciousness has often been
ignored or erased in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.
We asked the opinion rewriters to employ a judicial voice and to observe
the conventions of appellate opinion writing. Accepting the limitations of the
genre, we wanted the opinions to sound like opinions – not like legal scholarship or advocacy, which is what most of our authors are accustomed to writing.
This was important to the project’s realism. Some of our authors found this
requirement to be both liberating and constraining.10 While the judicial voice
is powerful, commanding and declarative, it is also a public voice in which

9
10

Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
As noted in the U.K. Feminist Judgments Introduction, “writing a judgment imposes certain
expectations and constraints on the writer that inevitably affect – even infect – her theoretical
purposes.” Feminist Judgments, supra note 5, at 5.
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the judge speaks not just for herself but also for her office. This public, official characteristic has traditionally required a certain dignity and forbearance
in tone as well as a writing style that conveys candor, fairness, and dispassion.
And while we wanted our authors to have the freedom to write as feminists,
however they defined the term, we also asked them to honor legal conventions such as procedural rules and traditions. For example, while the authors
could expand on the factual narrative contained within the original opinion,
they had to limit themselves to the legal record before the Court, unless it was
appropriate to use judicial notice for an easily verifiable fact.11
The authors of the commentaries had a formidable task, one perhaps even
more difficult than that of the authors of rewritten opinions. Besides providing a summary of and context for the original opinion, the commentary also
had to shed light on the feminist and theoretical underpinnings of the rewritten feminist judgment. Thus, when the feminist justice implicitly relied on
non-precedential authority, such as theories or studies that were published
after the date of the opinion, we encouraged the commentary author to discuss and cite those works to give credit to the feminist thinkers who made the
reasoning possible. The commentators had to accomplish all this in 2,000
words.12
Within these guidelines, the contributors were free to pursue their particular feminist visions. Mindful of the many diverse feminist views, as noted
above we did not define what “feminism” is or what the preferred feminist
view of a particular case should be. While our edits occasionally suggested
that authors consider the implications of certain works or theories, we did not
interfere with their freedom to see the case, and its importance, in their own
ways. Again within the constraints of the judicial opinion writing style already
noted, we allowed authors to use the argument frameworks, wording choices,
and writing style that they determined were most consistent with their feminist
approach to the case.
In some cases, we as editors disagreed strongly with a contributor’s approach.
And, in several cases, the opinion writer and the commentator disagreed
with each other. We expressed views in multiple rounds of edits, but each
11

12

This also was potentially constraining, as feminist legal theorists have argued that the law often
dismisses as irrelevant facts, circumstances, and contexts relevant to an outsider perspective.
See Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma’am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits,
and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 123 (1992). We recognized this problem, of
course, but, on balance, decided that any project could not address every problem of outsider
invisibility.
The Australian Feminist Judgments Project offered an interesting alternative: opinion and
commentary together could be 7,000 words, and the author and commentator could split that
up however they saw fit.
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contribution reflects its author’s view and choices. The reader will see occasional evidence of disagreements between opinion writers and commentators,
or might detect a failed compromise between the editors, on the one hand,
and a particular contributor, on the other, with respect to a piece’s substance,
tone or style. Rather than suppress these disagreements, though, we celebrate
them as part of, and a worthy extension of, the rich and diverse debate that
marks a dynamic field like feminist legal theory.

Topics and organization of cases
The twenty-five cases cover a wide range of doctrinal areas, but a majority concern constitutional law doctrines, such as equal protection and due
process, or interpretation of federal statutory law such as Title VII and
Title IX. Nearly half raise equal protection issues, and six address Title VII
claims. The cases touch on numerous legal issues related to justice and
equality, including reproductive rights, privacy, violence against women,
sexuality, and economic and racial justice. Included are core cases related
to gender and feminism that are familiar and expected (like Roe,13 Meritor,14
Geduldig15), but also some less well-known cases that were nevertheless
worthy of feminist attention, in part to demonstrate that issues of subordination can arise indirectly as well as directly. Thus, we also included cases on
immigration (Nguyen16), the Commerce Clause (Morrison17), and pensions
(Manhart18), to name just three.
The cases appear in the volume in chronological order from the earliest
(1873, Bradwell) to the most recent (2015, Obergefell). This will allow readers
to consider the evolution of feminism and feminist thought, both in the types
of legal issues that the Court addressed and the manner in which the issues are
approached. We considered alternatives for organizing the cases, such as by
doctrinal categories (e.g. “Equal Protection” and “Substantive Due Process”)
or by traditional areas of feminist inquiry (e.g. “Reproductive Freedom” or
“The Regulation of Sexuality”). We determined that these divisions were artificial for most of the innovative rewrites in the volume.19 Most of the feminist

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
The cases in the U.K. feminist judgments book are separated into traditional doctrinal categories such as “Parenting,” “Property and Markets,” and “Criminal Law and Evidence.”
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judgments exceed the boundaries of both traditional legal categories and
more feminist ones. We embraced the chronological organization as the most
neutral and free from editorial influence.

Common feminist themes in the feminist judgments
As we expected given the diversity of feminist thought, the feminist judgments
vary widely in their approaches. In the sections that follow, we have attempted
to identify common feminist themes and methods used in the rewritten judgments. Although we have categorized the theories and methods used by the
authors of the opinions, this categorization is loose at best. All of the opinions
cut across boundaries or fall into multiple categories.
In categorizing the common themes that emerged, we found that we covered some of the same theoretical ground as Professor Berta Hernández-Truyol
does in Chapter 2. To the extent our description or analysis of the theories
differs from that of Professor Hernández-Truyol, we note again the wide
variety of perspectives and interpretations that can arise within the feminist
legal community. We acknowledge that our views, experience, and situated
perspectives as editors influenced our creation of theoretical and methodological categories as well as our decisions about which opinions to place in
which category.
The volume contains fifteen re-imagined majority opinions, four concurring opinions, five dissenting opinions, and one partial concurrence/dissent.
The majority opinions are almost equally divided between those that
changed the ruling (eight), and those that changed the reasoning but not the
ruling (seven). One author of a majority opinion, Professor Deborah Rhode
in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, attempted to write an opinion that could
have garnered a majority of votes based on the composition of the Court at the
time. Most majority authors, however, wrote as if their opinions were persuasive enough to have garnered enough votes of their colleagues without regard
to the practical or political realities of the time. Authors pursuing the first
approach made somewhat limited feminist changes to the original opinion or
incorporated changes that reflected substantial compromises while authors in
the second group tended to write more expansive opinions with the potential
for transformative results.
Similarly, many of the feminist authors cite to feminist scholarship
more liberally than mainstream American jurisprudence does, taking
the implicit view that feminist scholarship is a legitimate and appropriate
source of authority. Citation to feminist scholarship as an authoritative
source can be seen in Professor Aníbal Rosario Lebrón’s dissenting opinion

14
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in United States v. Morrison and Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig’s
majority opinion in Meritor v. Vinson, among others.
In terms of substance, the feminist authors in many of the opinions
decided the case on the same legal grounds as the original, such as substantive due process or hostile work environment under Title VII. Others,
however, changed the legal basis for the opinion or added additional rationales. Interestingly, these rationales often raised equality and liberty points
in cases where the U.S. Supreme Court seemingly did not. For example,
Professor Laura Rosenbury’s Griswold v. Connecticut rejects the famous
“penumbra” privacy analysis of the original, finding that the contraception
ban at issue implicated equal protection and personal liberty. Similarly,
Professor Kim Mutcherson’s concurring opinion in Roe v. Wade rejects
Justice Blackmun’s controversial “trimester approach.” She acknowledges
that abortion raises privacy concerns, emphasizing that government efforts
to control the reproductive decisions of women and not men violates equal
protection. Similar changes in the legal underpinning of the decision occur
in Professor Ruthann Robson’s Lawrence v. Texas, Professor Carlos Ball’s
Obergefell v. Hodges, Professor Phyllis Goldfarb’s Bradwell v. Illinois, and
Professor Leslie Griffin’s Harris v. McRae.
Judging from the substance of their opinions, the dissenting authors
found a true freedom in being able to write separately. In her dissent in
Dothard v. Rawlinson, for example, Professor Maria Ontiveros would have
made Dothard the first U.S. Supreme Court opinion to recognize and
endorse a Title VII claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment.
Similarly, Professor Ann Bartow takes an unusual approach in her dissent
in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, focusing almost wholly
on the problems with the majority’s treatment of the story of the case and
only partly on the troublesome legal standard. In writing a dissenting opinion in Michael M. v. Superior Court, Professor Cynthia Godsoe found that
a gender-specific statutory rape law violated the Equal Protection Clause.
These dissenting opinions add a feminist voice where previously there was
none.20

20

Three of the cases in which the authors dissented, Michael M. v. Superior Court, Gebser
v. Lago Vista Independent School District, and United States v. Morrison, were decided on a
5–4 vote. While it is impossible to know, such close votes invite speculation about whether the
addition of a feminist justice (in Michael M., decided by all men, or in Gebser and Morrison,
in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented) might have changed the results in these
important cases.
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Feminist methods
A. Feminist practical reasoning
Feminist practical reasoning recognizes that what counts as a problem and
effective resolutions of that problem will depend on “the intricacies of each
specific factual context.”21 It brings together the voices and stories of individual women’s lived experiences with the broader historical, cultural, economic, and social context described in historical and social science research.
Feminist practical reasoning rejects the notion that there is a monolithic
source for reason, values and justifications, a notion that is often a hallmark
of traditional legal reasoning (consider the ubiquitous “reasonable person”
in tort law). Rather, feminist practical reasoning seeks to identify sources of
legal reasoning and values by drawing on the perspectives of “outsiders,”
or those excluded from or less powerful in the dominant culture. It also is
more open to conceding the bias inherent in any form of human reasoning
or decision making, including its own.22 Professor Lucinda Finley’s opinion
in Geduldig v. Aiello is an example of feminist practical reasoning as are the
feminist rewrite of Professor Pamela Laufer-Ukeles in Muller v. Oregon and
the feminist rewrite of Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales by Professor Maria
Isabel Medina.
B. Narrative feminist method
Related to feminist practical reasoning is the use of narrative to illuminate
the effects of the law on individual plaintiffs. While feminist practical reasoning may address both the individual story of the case and the broader
context in which the law is applied, narrative feminist method focuses on
presenting the facts of the particular case as a story. The story of the case is
critical to the legal outcome; how the decision maker sees the story, what
that person sees as relevant and irrelevant, and what inferences the decision
maker draws from the facts often drive the ultimate decision.23 Because of
the centrality of story to law, feminists and other critical legal scholars have
embraced narrative as a distinctive method of subverting and disrupting the
21
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dominant legal discourse. Feminist narrative method seeks to reveal and
oppose the bias and power dynamics inherent in the law’s purported neutrality by including and asserting the relevance of facts that are important to
those outside the mainstream account in law. Feminist narrative also shines
a light on facts or topics that the law often shies away from or euphemizes,
such as sexuality, the law’s racism, or the details of rape or other violence
against women. By euphemizing or obscuring ugly truths about society,
legal arguments and legal decisions allow them to proliferate because they
remain invisible.24 Narrative method also humanizes the law by focusing on
the actual people involved in the cases and the harms done to them rather
than on abstract rules and ideals.
Many of the authors expanded on, added to, or structurally altered the
factual recitations of the original opinions. While our guidelines, in accordance with legal convention, restricted the authors to the record before the
U.S. Supreme Court, many authors delved into that record to uncover
facts that had been overlooked, dismissed as legally irrelevant, or otherwise
deleted from the narrative on which the decision was ultimately based.
Expanded or re-envisioned narratives are used in several feminist judgments,
including those by Professor Deborah Rhode in Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Professor Ann McGinley in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc., Professor Ann Bartow in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District, Professor Teri McMurtry-Chubb in Loving v. Virginia, and Professor
Lucinda Finley in Geduldig v. Aiello.
C. Breaking rhetorical conventions
Some feminist authors used conventional and traditional judicial tone and
language, but others pushed the boundaries of the genre. The editors flagged
the oppositional language and discussed it among ourselves and with the
authors and commentators. On balance, however, the editors honored the
author’s wishes if the author felt that the language was essential to her feminist
vision. Several of our authors argued that it was sometimes important to depart
from conventional language and rhetoric because the bias inherent in the
substance of the opinions is likely to be reflected, or further obscured, by the
conventions of judicial writing that counsel in favor of neutral word choices
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and a judicious, impersonal tone. In other words, they could not conform to
those conventions and fully realize their feminist vision.25
Thus, in some of the narratives of the feminist judgments, readers will see
an unusual level of frankness as well as a conscious use of bold and explicit
language or a humbler approach to the Court’s power. So, for example, in
Professor Ruthann Robson’s rewrite of Lawrence v. Texas, readers will see
the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly apologize for the damage caused by a
mistaken prior ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick,26 an unprecedented rhetorical
approach in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudential history. In United States
v. Virginia, Professor Valorie Vojdik states that the Virginia Women’s Institute
for Leadership, the remedy offered by VMI to cure its male-only policy, is not
a remedy, but “misogyny,” marking the first time that the U.S. Supreme Court
would have used the word “misogyny” in this way. Finally Professor Laura
Rosenbury’s opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut uses explicit sexual language,
including a reference to orgasm and the joy of sexual relationships, to convey
a refreshing endorsement and approval of sexuality as a core liberty and relational interest.
D. Widening the lens27
Although some authors took an unconventional approach to judicial opinion
writing, many wrote opinions that are indistinguishable in style, tone, and
structure from prototypical judicial decisions. In this category, we place opinions in which the authors shifted their focus by looking at what assumptions
were being made and whose interests were at stake in the original opinions.28
While staying within the boundaries of existing legal doctrine and using recognizably paradigmatic modes of legal reasoning, they relied on alternative
legal rules; they framed issues more narrowly or more broadly; and they presented different rationales. In this category, we would put Professor Phyllis
Goldfarb’s Bradwell v. Illinois, Professor Tracy Thomas’s City of Los Angeles
Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, and Professor Martha Chamallas’s
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, among others.
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Feminist theories
A. Formal equality
Given the history of sex discrimination, many of the opinions confront laws
that explicitly differentiate on the basis of sex (e.g., Frontiero,29 Manhart30)
and consequently, the feminist judgments rest on notions of formal equality. Formal equality is among the earliest of feminist legal philosophies.
It grew out of a time when sex differences were seen as inherent and
unchangeable, and as a result, discrimination based on sex was acceptable
and overt. Formal equality seeks to fix explicit sex discrimination by asserting that similarly situated people should be treated the same regardless of
sex or gender and that invidious use of a sex classification is presumptively
unlawful.31
Several feminist judgments rely on formal equality principles, including
Professor Cynthia Godsoe in Michael M. v. Superior Court and Professor
Karen Czapanskiy in Stanley v. Illinois. Two of the majority opinions dealing
with equality, Professor Dara Purvis’s Frontiero v. Richardson and Professor
Lisa Pruitt’s Planned Parenthood v. Casey, explicitly mandate strict scrutiny
for gender classifications, a change that would no doubt have effected a major
transformation in law and culture. In Frontiero, four of the nine justices in
the original decision voted for strict scrutiny, so only one additional vote was
needed to change the course of legal history. That close vote certainly invites
speculation about “what could have been” had the justices come from a more
diverse cross-section of society.
B. Anti-subordination/dominance feminism
Although formal equality succeeded in eradicating most of the explicitly discriminatory laws, many feminist advocates realized that formal equality’s “sex
neutral” approach was little help in dealing with more subtle or ingrained
structural oppressions. As Catharine MacKinnon notes, gender neutrality in
law will always favor men because “society advantages them before they get
into court, and law is prohibited from taking that preference into account
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because that would mean taking gender into account … So the fact that
women will live their lives, as individuals, as members of the group women,
with women’s chances in a sex discriminatory society, may not count, or else it
is sex discrimination.”32 The limitations of formal equality were first apparent
in the context of pregnancy, but, as many of the cases in this volume show, the
doctrine is entrenched in law, often to women’s detriment. As a result, many
of the feminist judgments in this volume embrace anti-subordination doctrine
and related theories such as substantive equality and structural feminism. In
several of the judgments, the influence of Catharine MacKinnon’s work is
also apparent.
Anti-subordination feminism is a theory based on the recognition of social
oppression of certain groups. The theory posits that even facially neutral policies are invidious and illegal if they perpetuate existing oppressions and hierarchies based on categories like race and sex.33 This theory seeks to eradicate
the more subtle forms of discrimination and injustice without sacrificing helpful laws that differentiate based on group affiliation, such as affirmative action.
Like anti-subordination theory, the related structural feminism locates the
primary sources of oppression in social structures such as patriarchy and capitalism.34 Professor MacKinnon’s work adds a layer to these theories, positing
that not only are there manifest power imbalances between men and women
rooted in the basic building blocks of law and society, but also that these power
imbalances are eroticized and sexualized to women’s detriment, particularly
in laws related to rape, spousal abuse and pornography.35
These theories, often in conjunction with others, appear throughout several
of the feminist judgments, including Professor Valorie Vojdik’s concurring
opinion in United States v. Virginia and Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig’s
majority opinion in Meritor v. Vinson, among others.
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C. Anti-stereotyping
Anti-stereotyping doctrine critiques the law’s adherence to sex roles and its
normative judgments about what a woman (and a man) should be. Related to
anti-essentialism, anti-stereotyping seeks to disrupt the law’s reinforcement of
traditional roles for men and women. Some commentators credit Ruth Bader
Ginsburg with bringing anti-stereotyping doctrine to U.S. jurisprudence in
the 1970s. They argue that fighting gender roles was at the core of Ginsburg’s
litigation strategy.36 Perhaps due to Ginsburg’s efforts, anti-stereotyping has
found its way into U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence to a certain extent,
most notably in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins37 as well as Ginsburg’s opinion in United States v. Virginia.38 This provided a rich foundation for our
authors to build upon for their revised versions as they rejected common,
fixed impressions of men and women widely held in American society and
law. Anti-stereotyping theory is evident in Professor David Cohen’s majority
opinion in Rostker v. Goldberg, and Professor Maria Ontiveros’s concurrence/
dissent in Dothard v. Rawlinson, among others.
In the anti-stereotyping realm, several of the feminist judgments employ
and cite social science data, readily available at the time of the opinion, that
undermine widely held beliefs about women and men. The use of contemporaneous social science data is a critical tool to demonstrate that law and legal
reasoning are often intertwined with and based on unsupported and stereotypical normative assumptions about sex roles, masculinity and femininity. A
key foundation for Professor Martha Chamallas’s concurring opinion in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, for example, is that courts should carefully examine
and credit expert testimony by social scientists over the mechanical application of traditional ideas about sex and sex roles.
Masculinities theory, a relative newcomer to feminist legal theory, also
plays a strong role in some of the rewritten opinions. Masculinities theory
is an anti-stereotyping theory, but where some of the early anti-stereotyping
theory focused exclusively on women’s idealized roles, masculinities theory
posits that damaging stereotypical assumptions about manhood also infect our
culture, and, consequently, our laws. The theory focuses on deconstructing
the norm of masculinity as damaging not just to women, but also to men
who fail to conform to that norm. Still recognizing that as a group, men have
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more power than women, masculinities also encapsulates the idea that men
competing to prove an idealized notion of manhood often use women and
non-conforming men as “props” to enhance their own status power within
the masculinist hierarchy and to denigrate women and the feminine.39 The
masculinities branch of anti-stereotyping theory is evident in Professor Ann
McGinley’s revised majority opinion in Oncale v. Sundowner, for example.
D. Multi-dimensional theories: anti-essentialism and intersectionality
Another common theme in some of the judgments was anti-essentialism –
challenging the notion, prevalent in law and in much of early feminist theory,
that there is a fixed and identifiable “essence” that characterizes a certain set
of human beings, such as women.40 Relatedly, some of the feminist judgments
explore themes of intersectionality, a legal approach that recognizes that gender is only one potential axis of discrimination and that discrimination against
women is often combined with and compounded by oppression based on
race, sexuality, class, and ethnicity. Beyond the recognition of multiple forms
of oppression, intersectionality provides a theoretical framework through
which the law can recognize and remedy those multiple oppressions instead
of forcing a case into one distilled category of discrimination.41 These theories
are evident in the opinions of Professor Lisa Pruitt in her rewritten majority
opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Professor Teri McMurtry-Chubb in
her majority opinion in Loving v. Virginia, and Professor Ilene Durst in her
majority opinion in Nguyen v. INS, among others.
E. Autonomy and agency
Several authors also relied on agency and autonomy rationales, noting that in
addition to arguments based on deprivations of liberty under the Due Process
Clause, the Constitution provides support for the argument that the government must act affirmatively to provide opportunities for full citizenship.
39
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Related to agency and autonomy, a true joy in sexual awareness and liberation
can be seen in several of the feminist judgments. This sex-positive feminism
is often attributed to third-wave feminists, who celebrate the joy of sexuality
and sexual agency and tend to reject the tropes of passive victimhood that
some associate with the second wave.42 Though, to be fair, the emphasis on
the centrality of sexual experience is related to, and may have developed
from, ideas of relational, or hedonic, feminists, who criticize feminism for
ignoring women’s happiness and emphasize the importance of human relationships to women’s approach to life and law.43 Sexual autonomy rationales
appear in Professor Carlos Ball’s majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges and
Professor Kim Mutcherson’s majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, among others.
They are especially vivid in Professor Laura Rosenbury’s rewrite of Griswold
v. Connecticut.

Conclusion
The richness and diversity of the rewritten opinions, as well as the incisive
analysis of the commentaries, exceeded our expectations and goals. The opinions and commentaries reveal the breadth and depth of feminism and demonstrate the viability and practicality of using feminist legal theories and feminist
methods to decide legal questions. Illustrating applied feminism, the opinions and commentaries reflect their authors’ informed and distinctive choices
about the grounds of legal reasoning, the forms of legal arguments, and the
effects of language use. The volume reveals clearly the situated perspective
inherent in judging, but also shows that widening the range of potential perspectives can make a significant difference. In other words, the law can be
a dynamic and vibrant source of change, especially if its interpretation and
formation includes judges of different experiences, backgrounds, and worldviews. We hope that the book will be an instructive, educational, and even
inspirational resource for academics, students, lawyers, and judges alike.
The volume is both an academic text and a practical illustration of applied
feminism. We hope it will arouse interest beyond the legal academic market.
The book embraces an educational function regardless of audience. Students
might learn about the law and feminism. The legal community and the wider
public might learn about the way law works, what cases mean, and how the
identity and philosophy of judges matter. For every reader, the book is an
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opportunity to contemplate the arc of justice, and the important role that
feminism can play in achieving it for women and all people who challenge
traditional gender roles.
A final note on the order of the editors’ names. Because Kathy Stanchi
brought the three of us together as editors, we decided that her name should
be listed first. A coin toss determined the order of the other two editors’ names.
From the time the three of us began to work together on the project, this
has been a collaborative endeavor to which we contributed equally. In keeping with our feminist philosophy, we aimed to achieve unanimity on all editorial decisions. Thus, while we know that citation conventions traditionally
use only the first editor’s name, this convention does not reflect accurately
the equal contributions of the editors to the project. Accordingly, we ask that
those citing our work use all three editors’ names in the citation. Feminism
should make a difference not only in judging, but also in scholarship and the
conventions of attribution.
We hope that you are as pleased and excited as we are at the results of this
collaborative project. Enjoy!

